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Abstract: In this paper an enhanced fuzzy vault scheme is 
proposed which we refer to as fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme. The 
proposed scheme builds on the classical fuzzy vault by adding 
the concept of uncertainty and imprecision to the classical 
scheme. To lock a secret key  in the classical fuzzy vault the 
locking and unlocking elements are crisp or real elements and 
consequently the locking and unlocking operations are strict 
imperative. In the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme, Alice locks the 
secret key  using a set of fuzzy elements that belong to multi-
fuzzy set ?̃? obtained from a universe public set of fuzzy 
elements in a multi-fuzzy set ?̃?𝑞 and projecting them on 
polynomial 𝑝. The elements in multi-fuzzy sets ?̃?𝑞  and ?̃? are 
fuzzy- using 𝑚 membership functions 𝑀𝐹𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2,…𝑚.  Alice 
selects a set 𝑘 of fuzzy elements fuzzy- with a specific 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑘 from ?̃? to lock the vault.  To hide the 
genuine locking points Alice generates a set of fuzzy chaff 
points that some of them do not lie on polynomial 𝑝 while the 
other fuzzy chaff points may lie on polynomial 𝑝 but fuzzy- 
with different membership functions other than the membership 
𝑀𝐹𝑘 used to lock the vault. To unlock the fuzzy- fuzzy vault and 
retrieve the secret key  , Bob should have a set of unlocking 
fuzzy elements belonging to multi-fuzzy set ?̃? which 
substantially overlap with ?̃? is required. Then Bob selects 
𝑡′𝑇𝐹𝑘𝑖  fuzzy elements from ?̃? which are close to the 𝑡𝑇𝐹𝑘  fuzzy 
elements from ?̃? used by Alice to lock the vault. We show that 
adding uncertainty and imprecision by introducing fuzzy theory 
will enhance the security threshold of the fuzzy vault. 
Index Terms—Fuzzy vaults, fuzzy sets, fuzzy arithmetic, 
fuzzy numbers, security, privacy. 
94A60 Cryptography, 03E72 Fuzzy set theory, 08A72 Fuzzy 
algebraic structures, 68P25 Data encryption, 68P30 Coding and 
information theory 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he classical fuzzy vault scheme was first introduced 
by Juels and Sudan in [1]. It is essentially constructed 
to protect user’s secrets whether they are keys or private 
information by using some features from his/her unique 
biometrics such as fingerprints. A classical fuzzy vault is 
composed of a lock algorithm where a set of points are 
selected to lock the vault and the unlocking algorithm 
uses a subset that is close enough to the locking set to 
retrieve the secret information. The classical fuzzy vault 
includes two parameters the finite field 𝐹𝑞 with 𝑞 a power 
of prime and the Reed-Solomon error correction 
algorithm [2]. If we assume that the locking and 
unlocking of the fuzzy vault has to be made in fuzzy 
environments, quite a number of fuzzy operations exist. 
First of all, the user might really not actually want to 
reduce or minimize the security level of the vault.  Rather 
he might want to reach some higher security levels which 
might not be achievable using crisp sets for locking and 
unlocking the classical fuzzy vault.  In other words, the 
user wants to improve the present security levels 
considerably. Second, the elements and operations might 
be vague and not behaving as in the strictly mathematical 
sense but smaller violations are tolerable. The elements, 
numbers and coefficients can have different membership 
grades because we assume they are fuzzy in nature or 
each element or number has fuzzy perception. 
Consequently the role of the fuzzy elements and fuzzy 
numbers can be different from that in classical fuzzy 
vaults where all locking and unlocking elements are of 
equal weight. In other words, the fuzzy elements of the 
fuzzy- fuzzy vault may be of different importance with 
different degrees. Fuzzy- fuzzy vaults allow for all types 
of uncertainty and imprecision and we shall discuss some 
of them below. 
II.  MOTIVATION 
The classical fuzzy vaults do not incorporate 
uncertainty and imprecision in the vault and assume all 
elements required to lock secret  in the vault or to unlock 
the vault to retrieve secret  are all of equal importance 
(weight). Imprecision and uncertainty improve the 
security threshold of the classical cryptographic 
techniques. Consequently, locking a secret key under the 
fuzzy set increases the degree of protection for this key. 
The concept of chaff points of the fuzzy vault is extended 
by using membership functions as fuzzy chaff points can 
lie on polynomial 𝑝 but have membership grade functions 
different from the membership grade function used to 
fuzzify the genuine fuzzy points that lie on polynomial 𝑝 
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and used to lock the fuzzy- fuzzy vault. This means that 
fuzzy chaff points will include fuzzy points that do not lie 
on polynomial 𝑝 and the fuzzy points that lie on 
polynomial 𝑝 but with different membership functions, 
other than that used in fuzzifying the locking points. 
Adding this layer of uncertainty to the fuzzy vault and by 
extending the concept of chaff points will enhance its 
security level.  
 
     This paper is organized as follows: section III presents 
some preliminaries of fuzzy numbers and fuzzy 
arithmetic, section IV presents the fuzzy- fuzzy vault 
scheme, section V presents the security analysis of the 
proposed vault, finally section VI for application of fuzzy- 
fuzzy vault and finally section VII is dedicated for 
conclusions. 
III. Preliminaries 
 
A. Fuzzy sets 
If 𝑋 is a collection of objects denoted generically 
by 𝑥, then a fuzzy set ?̃? in 𝑋 is a set of ordered pairs [3]: 
?̃? = {(𝑥,
𝐴
(𝑥)|𝑥 ∈ 𝑋)}                                              (1) 
Where 
𝐴
(𝑥) is called the membership function which 
maps 𝑋 to the membership space 𝑀. Its range is the 
subset of nonnegative real numbers whose supremum is 
finite.  
For sup 
𝐴
(𝑥) = 1: normalized fuzzy set. 
 
B.  Fuzzy numbers 
A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set like: 
𝑢 ∶  𝑅 →  𝐼 =  [0, 1] which satisfies [4]: 
 𝑢 is upper semi-continuous, 
 𝑢(𝑥)  =  0 outside some interval [𝑎, 𝑑], 
 There are real numbers a, b such that a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d and: 
 𝑢(𝑥) is monotonic increasing on [𝑎, 𝑏], 
 𝑢(𝑥) is monotonic decreasing on [𝑐, 𝑑], 
 𝑢(𝑥)  =  1, 𝑏 ≤  𝑥 ≤  𝑐. 
The membership function 𝑢 can be expressed as: 
 
𝑢(𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑢𝐿(𝑥),                    𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
1,                             𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
𝑢𝑅(𝑥),                    𝑐 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑
0,                             𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
                      (2) 
Where 𝑢𝐿: [𝑎, 𝑏] → [0,1] and 𝑢𝑅: [𝑐, 𝑑] → [0,1] are left 
and right membership functions of fuzzy number 𝑢. 
 
1. The trapezoidal fuzzy number ?̃?  =  (𝑥0, 𝑦0, 𝜎 , 𝛽), 
with two defuzzifiers 𝑥0, 𝑦0, and left fuzziness 𝜎 >  0 
and right fuzziness  > 0 is a fuzzy set where the 
membership function is [5]: 
 
𝜇?̃?(𝑥) =
{
  
 
  
 
1
𝜎
(𝑥 − 𝑥0 +  𝜎)         𝑥0 −  𝜎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥0
1,                                   𝑥 ∈ [ 𝑥0, 𝑦0]
1
 𝛽
(𝑦0 − 𝑥 +  𝛽)         𝑦0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦0 + 𝛽
0,                                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
   (3) 
   
2. The triangular fuzzy number ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑟) 𝑇𝐹(?̃?) 
where 𝑇𝐹(?̃?) is a triangular membership function of all 
triangular fuzzy numbers ?̃?  ∈  ?̃? with membership 
function 𝜇?̃? is[4]:   
 
𝜇?̃?(𝑥) = {
1 −
𝑎𝑠−𝑥  
𝑎𝑙
, (𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑠
1 +
𝑎𝑠−𝑥
𝑎𝑟
, 𝑎𝑠 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ (𝑎𝑠 + 𝑎𝑟)
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                
                  (4) 
such that ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑟)𝑇𝐹(?̃?)  
3. The sigmoid fuzzy number ?̃? = (𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3;) in the 
domain [−𝑎, 𝑎]  is defined using the membership 
function [6]: 
𝜇?̃?(𝑥)
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
 ({𝑥 −
𝑎1 + 𝑎2
2 } ×
2𝑎
𝑎2 − 𝑎1
) − (−𝑎)
(𝑎) − (−𝑎)
) ,    𝑎1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎2 
(
(𝑎) −  ({𝑥 −
𝑎2 + 𝑎3
2 } ×
2𝑎
𝑎3 − 𝑎2
)
(𝑎) − (−𝑎)
) ,   𝑎2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎3     (5)
0,                                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                   
 
Where:  
(𝑎) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑎
                       (6) 
is a sigmoid function. 
4. The Gaussian fuzzy number ?̃? has the following 
membership function [7]: 
 
𝜇?̃?(𝑥) = 
 
{
 
 
 
 
0,                                            𝑥 ≤ ?̅? −  3𝜎𝑙
exp [−
(x−x̅)2
2𝜎𝑙
2 ],                               ?̅? −  3𝜎𝐿 < 𝑥 < ?̅?
exp [−
(x−x̅)2
2𝜎𝑟
2 ],                               ?̅? ≤ 𝑥 < ?̅? + 3𝜎𝑟
0,                                                𝑥 ≥ ?̅? +  3𝜎𝐿
 (7) 
The mean value is denoted by the parameter ?̅? , and 𝜎𝑙 
and 𝜎𝑟 denoting standard deviations of the Gaussian 
distribution. 
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C. Fuzzy arithmetic 
     We apply fuzzy arithmetic operations on triangular 
fuzzy numbers as an example although they can be 
applied on other types of fuzzy numbers such as sigmoid, 
Gaussian and trapezoidal fuzzy numbers: 
Let ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑟), ?̃? = (𝑏𝑙 , 𝑏𝑠, 𝑏𝑟)𝑇𝐹(𝑅) then [8]: 
If 𝑥 > 0 then 𝑥?̃? = (𝑥𝑎𝑙 , 𝑥𝑎𝑠 , 𝑥𝑎𝑟)                              (8) 
If 𝑥 < 0 then 𝑥?̃? = (−𝑥𝑎𝑙 ,  𝑥𝑎𝑠, − 𝑥𝑎𝑟)                      (9)                     
?̃? + ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 + 𝑏𝑙 , 𝑎𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠, 𝑎𝑟 + 𝑏𝑟)                           (10) 
?̃? − ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 + 𝑏𝑟 , 𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠 , 𝑎𝑟 + 𝑏𝑙)                           (11) 
 
D. 𝑛𝑡ℎ Power of fuzzy number 
    We also apply finding the 𝑛𝑡ℎ power on triangular 
fuzzy numbers although it can be applied on other types 
of fuzzy numbers such as sigmoid, Gaussian and 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers: 
Let ?̃? = (𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑠, 𝑎𝑟) > 0 be a fuzzy number, then     ?̃? = 
[(𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) + 𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑟 − (𝑎𝑟 − 𝑎𝑠)] is the -cut of the 
fuzzy number ?̃? [6].  
To calculate the 𝑛𝑡ℎ power of the fuzzy number ?̃? we first 
take the 𝑛𝑡ℎ power of the -cut of ?̃? using interval 
arithmetic: 
(?̃? )
𝑛 = ([(𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) + 𝑎𝑙 , 𝑎𝑟 − (𝑎𝑟 − 𝑎𝑠)])
𝑛 
=[((𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) + 𝑎𝑙)
𝑛, (𝑎𝑟 − (𝑎𝑟 − 𝑎𝑠))
𝑛]            (12) 
To find the membership function 
?̃?𝑛
(?̃?)  we equate to 𝑥 
both the first and second component in eq.(12) which 
gives: 
𝑥 = ((𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) + 𝑎𝑙)
𝑛                                    (13) 
𝑥 = (𝑎𝑟 − (𝑎𝑟 − 𝑎𝑠))
𝑛                 (14) 
√𝑥
𝑛 = (𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎𝑙) + 𝑎𝑙                     (15)  
√𝑥
𝑛 = 𝑎𝑟 − (𝑎𝑟 − 𝑎𝑠)                 (16) 
Expressing  in terms of 𝑥 as follows: 
 =
√𝑥
𝑛
 − 𝑎𝑙 
(𝑎𝑠−𝑎𝑙)
 ,   𝑎𝑙
𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑠
𝑛                                   (17) 
 =
 𝑎𝑟 − √𝑥
𝑛
 
(𝑎𝑟−𝑎𝑠)
,  𝑎𝑠
𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑟
𝑛                                    (18) 
Which gives: 

?̃?𝑛
(𝑥) = {
√𝑥
𝑛
 − 𝑎𝑙 
(𝑎𝑠−𝑎𝑙)
 ,   𝑎𝑙
𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑠
𝑛
 𝑎𝑟 − √𝑥
𝑛
 
(𝑎𝑟−𝑎𝑠)
,  𝑎𝑠
𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑟
𝑛 
                  
             (19) 
 
IV.  Fuzzy- Fuzzy Vault Scheme 
In this section, we fuzzify the classical fuzzy vault 
scheme proposed by Ari Juels and Madhu Sudan in [1] 
by incorporating imprecision and uncertainty through 
using the fuzzy theory. We show that the fuzzy- fuzzy 
vault scheme will provide a higher security level than the 
classical fuzzy vault scheme. The main difference 
between the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme ?̃?𝐴 locked using a 
fuzzy set 𝐴 ̃and the classical fuzzy vault scheme 
𝑉𝐴 locked using crisp set 𝐴 is the fuzzy environment into 
which the locking and unlocking operations take place. 
Assume that Alice wants to lock a secret key  under 
fuzzy set ?̃?. Alice calculates the key’s signature using the 
CRC-16 bits and append this signature to key . Alice 
then encodes the augmented secret key  by dividing it 
into parts and injects these parts into the coefficients of 
polynomial 𝑝. Alice selects a finite field 𝐹𝑞 with size 𝑞 
and partitions it into 𝑚𝐹 subsets with different or equal 
sizes such that 𝐹𝑞𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,2, … . .𝑚𝐹. Alice then generates 
a multi-fuzzy set ?̃?𝑞 by fuzzifying its subsets using a set 
of 𝑚 membership functions such that: 
𝑀𝐹(?̃?𝑞) = ⋃ 𝑀𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑞𝑖)
𝑚𝐹
𝑖=1  where ?̃?𝑞𝑖 ⊂ ?̃?𝑞             (20) 
Alice selects from ?̃?𝑞 a locking fuzzy set ?̃? which 
contains 𝑚𝐴 fuzzy subsets with different or equal sizes 
which are fuzzy- using 𝑚𝐴 membership functions such 
that ?̃?𝑖 ⊂ ?̃?, 𝑖 = 1,2, … .𝑚𝐴. Alice then forms a multi-
fuzzy set of locking points ?̃? such that: 
    𝑀𝐹(?̃?) = ⋃ 𝑀𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖)
𝑚𝐴
𝑖=1  where ?̃?𝑖 ⊂ ?̃?                 (21)  
Where 𝑀𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖) is the fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑖  fuzzy- with 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑖. 
Alice selects a crisp polynomial 𝑝 such that: 
𝑝(?̃?𝑖) =  𝛽𝑛?̃?𝑖
𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛−1?̃?𝑖
𝑛−1 +⋯+ 𝛽1?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽0         (22) 
Where: 
𝛽𝑗: is the  𝑗
𝑡ℎ coefficient of polynomial 𝑝.  
Alice selects a subset ?̃?𝑘 ⊂ ?̃? which is fuzzy- by 
membership 𝑀𝐹𝑘 where |?̃?𝑘| = 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘  fuzzy points   and 
project these fuzzy points on polynomial 𝑝 to obtain the 
set: 
{(?̃?𝑖 , 𝑝(?̃?𝑖))|𝑖 = 1……… . 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘}               (23) 
where:   
?̃?𝑖?̃?𝑘 , 𝑝(?̃?𝑖) is the projection of ?̃?𝑖 on polynomial p.  
Alice assigns ?̃?𝑖 to ?̃?𝑖 and assigns 𝑝(?̃?𝑖) to ?̃?𝑖  such that: 
𝑅 = {(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖)|𝑖 = 1…… . 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘}                                    (24) 
where: 
(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖) ← (?̃?𝑖 , 𝑝(?̃?𝑖))                                         
Finally, Alice creates fuzzy chaff points that do not lie on 
polynomial 𝑝 or may lie on polynomial 𝑝 but with 
membership functions other than the membership 
function 𝑀𝐹𝑘 i.e. ?̃?𝑖 ∉ ?̃?𝑀𝐹𝑘  and ?̃?𝑖 ≠ 𝑝(?̃?𝑖). 
∴ The set of chaff points is {(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖)|𝑖 = 1… 𝑡𝑴𝑭𝒋≠𝒌}                                                  
                                                                                    (25) 
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Finally, Alice adds (?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖) to  𝑅  so that: 
𝑅 = 𝑅 ∪ {(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖)} 
∴ 𝑅 = {(?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖), (?̃?𝑖 , ?̃?𝑖) |∀?̃?𝑖 ∈ ?̃?𝑘, ∀?̃?𝑖 ∈ ?̃?𝑞 , ?̃?𝑖 ∉
?̃?𝑘, ∀?̃?𝑖 ∈ {?̃?𝑞 −  𝑝(?̃?𝑖)} }                                           (26)                        
 
If Bob wants to unlock the fuzzy- fuzzy vault to retrieve 
  he must selects a crisp set 𝐵 and partitions it into 𝑚𝐵 
subsets. Bob finds ?̃? by using a set of 𝑚𝐵 membership 
functions such that: 
𝑀𝐹(?̃?) = ⋃ 𝑀𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖) 
𝑚𝐵
𝑖=1 where ?̃?𝑖 ⊂ ?̃?                    (27) 
Then Bob selects a fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 which is fuzzy- with 
the membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑘 i.e. ?̃?𝑘 ⊂ ?̃? where 
|?̃?𝑘|= 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘   which is close enough to subset ?̃?𝑘 ⊂ ?̃? 
where |?̃?𝑘| = 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘 . 
If |?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖 |≤ 𝛿  then Bob adds the corresponding fuzzy 
point in 𝑅 to 𝑄                                                         (28) 
∴ 𝑄 = {(?̃?i, ?̃?𝑖)|𝑖 = 1……… . 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘}                           (29) 
such that: 
?̃?i ← ?̃?𝑖, ?̃?𝑖 ∈ 𝑅  
If ?̃?𝑘 is close enough to ?̃?𝑘 then Bob will reconstruct 
polynomial 𝑝∗ and reconstruct the secret ∗. If the CRC-
16 bits signature extracted from ∗ is the same as the 
CRC-16 bits signature appended to  then Bob will 
obtain the secret key  otherwise he receives 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙.    
Now, assume Eve is an attacker who illegally wants to 
obtain secret  from the fuzzy- fuzzy vault. Eve does not 
know about the crisp polynomial 𝑝, the fuzzy locking 
set ?̃?, the number and size of ?̃? subsets, the 
𝑚𝐴 membership functions used to fuzzify the subsets 
of ?̃?, nor the fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 ⊂ ?̃? used to lock the secret 
key  in the polynomial 𝑝. This means that Eve does not 
have any information on 𝑀𝐹(?̃?𝑞) of eq.(20),  𝑀𝐹(?̃?) of 
eq.(21) nor polynomial 𝑝 in eq.(22). Therefore, Eve must 
guess a crisp set 𝐵 and the 𝑚𝐴 membership functions to 
construct ?̃? in eq.(27) to be close enough to ?̃? , guess the 
fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 to be close enough to ?̃?𝑘, guess 
polynomial 𝑝 to find 𝑄 in eq.(29).   
Assume that Eve has succeeded to guess polynomial 𝑝, 
crisp set 𝐵 but failed to guess the 𝑚𝐴 membership 
functions that are used to fuzzify set ?̃?, the 𝑚𝐹 
membership functions that are used to fuzzify the finite 
field ?̃?𝑞, the fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 to be close enough to ?̃?𝑘 . 
Then Eve with a very high probability will fail to 
reconstruct the secret key  from the fuzzy- fuzzy vault as 
it will be shown in the security analysis in section 5. 
Without any information about the fuzzy subsets and 
their membership functions the attacker will not know 
about the structure of the fuzzy numbers used to lock the 
vault or the structure of the polynomial 𝑝 used to hide the 
secret  . For example, assume Alice partitioned the crisp 
set 𝐹𝑞 into four crisp subsets: 𝐹𝑞1,𝐹𝑞2,𝐹𝑞3,𝐹𝑞4and used 
Gaussian membership function to fuzzify ?̃?𝑞1 , sigmoid 
function to fuzzify ?̃?𝑞2, trapezoidal function to fuzzify ?̃?𝑞3 
and triangular membership function to fuzzify ?̃?𝑞4  and 
formed a multi-fuzzy set ?̃?𝑞 = ⋃ ?̃?𝑞𝑖
4
𝑖=1 . Assume that 
Alice has selected three fuzzy subsets ?̃?1, ?̃?2 and ?̃?3 from 
?̃?𝑞 such that ?̃?1 is fuzzy- with a triangular membership 
function, ?̃?2 is fuzzy- with a Gaussian membership 
function  and ?̃?3 is fuzzy- with sigmoid function and she 
formed   ?̃? = ⋃ ?̃?𝑖
3
𝑖=1 . She secretly used the fuzzy 
subset  ?̃?2 to lock her secret key   into crisp 
polynomial 𝑝. So, Eve does not know about the number 
of subsets of ?̃?𝑞 nor the size of each subset and does not 
know about the 𝑚 membership functions used to fuzzify 
these subsets. Also, Eve does not know about the number 
of subsets of ?̃? and the size of each subset and does not 
know about the membership functions used to fuzzify 
these subsets. This means that although Eve may guess a 
correct crisp set 𝐵 but does not know about the multi-
fuzzy set𝑠  ?̃?𝑞 and ?̃? and does not know about the 
membership functions that used to fuzzify each of them. 
Also, Eve does not know about the fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 used 
to lock the secret key  in polynomial 𝑝, this makes the 
fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘 not close enough with any fuzzy subset 
?̃?𝑘 guessed by Eve. As a result, Eve with a very high 
probability will fail to obtain the secret key  which adds 
a better security level to the fuzzy- fuzzy vault. 
To describe the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme we need the 
following definitions: 
𝐹𝑞: a finite field of size 𝑞. 
?̃?𝑞: a fuzzy- finite field of size 𝑞. 
: the secret key to be kept into the vault where 𝐹𝑞
. 
𝑝(𝑥): polynomial of degree less than . 
𝑝(𝑥) ←  ∶ assigns secret key  to polynomial 𝑝. 
?̃? ={?̃?1,?̃?2, …… , ?̃?𝑡} is a locking fuzzy set fuzzified with 
𝑚𝐴 membership functions 𝑀𝐹𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, …… .𝑚𝐴 where 
?̃?𝑖𝑀𝐹(?̃?).  
?̃? ={?̃?1,?̃?2, …… , ?̃?𝑡}  is an unlocking fuzzy set fuzzified 
with multiple membership functions 𝑀𝐹𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … . .𝑚𝐵 
where ?̃?𝑖𝑀𝐹(?̃?).  
𝑡: is the total number of genuine locking points. 
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘: is the number of fuzzy- genuine points using 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑘. 
?̃?𝑘: a locking fuzzy subset of ?̃? fuzzified with 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑘.  
?̃?𝑘: an unlocking fuzzy subset of ?̃? fuzzified with 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑘 
𝑟 − 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘: is the number of chaff points which include 
fuzzy- genuine points with membership functions other 
than 𝑀𝐹𝑘 and include chaff points that do not lie on 
polynomial p.  
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𝑟: is the total number of genuine points and chaff points 
such that 𝑟 ≤ 𝑞.  
   The FUZZY_LOCK algorithm has an input: secret 
key , crisp locking set 𝐴, total number of genuine 
locking points 𝑡, total number of locking points and 
chaff points 𝑟, finite field 𝐹𝑞 and polynomial degree 𝑛. 
FUZZY_LOCK  
Input: , 𝑨, 𝒕, 𝒓, 𝑭𝒒, 𝒏 
            𝒑(𝒙) =  𝜷𝒏𝒙
𝒏 + 𝜷𝒏−𝟏𝒙
𝒏−𝟏 +⋯+ 𝜷𝟏𝒙 + 𝜷𝟎 
Output: ?̃? = {(𝒙𝟏, ?̃?𝟏), (𝒙𝟐, ?̃?𝟐), …… .… . (𝒙𝐫, ?̃?𝐫)}  
where: (𝒙𝒊, ?̃?𝒊) = [(𝒙𝒊𝒍, 𝒚𝒊𝒍), (𝒙𝒊𝒔, 𝒚𝒊𝒔), (𝒙𝒊𝒓, 𝒚𝒊𝒓)]  
𝒙𝒊𝒍, 𝒚𝒊𝒍, 𝒙𝒊𝒔, 𝒚𝒊𝒔, 𝒙𝒊𝒓, 𝒚𝒊𝒓  ∈ 𝑭𝒒 
 (𝒙𝒊, ?̃?𝒊) 𝑴𝑭(𝑭?̃?) = ⋃ 𝑴𝑭𝒊(?̃?𝒒𝒊)
𝑚𝐹
𝒊=𝟏  
 𝑿,̃ ?̃? ← ∅ 
 Generate 𝟏𝟔 − 𝒃𝒊𝒕s CRC data from key  
 Append the 𝟏𝟔 − 𝐛𝐢𝐭𝐬 CRC data to key  
 Divide   into parts.  
 Inject the   parts into the coefficients of polynomial 
p so that: 𝒑 ←  
 Select a  fuzzy subset ?̃? from 𝑭?̃? such that: 
 𝑻𝑭(?̃?) = ⋃  𝑴𝑭𝒊(?̃?𝒊)
𝑚𝐴
𝒊=𝟏  
 Select fuzzy subset ?̃?𝒌 fuzzy- by membership 
function 𝑴𝑭𝒌 from ?̃? to lock the vault.  
 Let |?̃?𝒌|=𝒕𝑴𝑭𝒌  
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 = 𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝑴𝑭𝒌  do 
{ 
   (𝒙𝒊, ?̃?𝒊) ← (?̃?𝒊, 𝒑(?̃?𝒊))   
   ?̃?  ← ?̃?  ∪ (𝒙𝒊, ?̃?𝒊) 
   } 
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 = 𝒕𝑴𝑭𝒌 + 𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝒓 do  
   { 
     ?̃?𝒊 𝑭?̃? − ?̃?𝒌 
     ?̃?𝒊 𝑭?̃? − {𝒑(?̃?𝒊)} 
     ?̃?  ← ?̃?  ∪ (?̃?𝒊, ?̃?𝒊) 
    } 
 Scramble the fuzzy- fuzzy vault set ?̃? 
 
The fuzzy set ?̃?, secret key  and the parameters n, r 
together are called “fuzz-fuzzy vault”, denoted by ?̃?𝐴. In 
order for Bob to unlock the fuzz-fuzzy vault ?̃?𝐴 to retrieve 
the secret key , he must choose a crisp set 𝐵 that is close 
enough to crisp set 𝐴 and calculate ?̃? using 𝑚 multiple 
membership functions using eq.(22). Bob must select a 
fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘  which is fuzzy- using the membership 
function 𝑇𝐹𝑘. If a fuzzy point ?̃?  selected from ?̃?𝑘  is close 
enough to a fuzzy point ?̃?  from ?̃?𝑘 then the correspondent 
point for ?̃? in ?̃? is added to ?̃?. If a significant number of 
fuzzy points in ?̃?𝑘 are close enough to ?̃?𝑘 then Bob uses 
Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct the polynomial 𝑝∗ 
and retrieve the reconstructed key ∗. If the CRC-16 bits 
extracted from ∗ is the same as the CRC-16 bits appended 
to  then Bob will retrieve the key  otherwise he retrieves 
𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙. The FUZZY_UNLOCK algorithm has an input: 
fuzzy- fuzzy vault ?̃?𝐴 and the crisp unlocking set 𝐵. Its 
output is the secret value  if the fuzzy unlocking points 
are close enough to the fuzzy locking points or null if the 
fuzzy unlocking points are not close enough to the fuzzy 
locking points. 
FUZZY_UNLOCK  
Input: ?̃??̃? , 𝑩  
Output:  𝑭𝒒
 ∪ {𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍} 
 Generate ?̃? using a set of 𝒎 membership functions 
such that:  
𝑴𝑭(?̃?) = ⋃ 𝑴𝑭𝒊(?̃?𝒊)
𝑚𝐵
𝒊=𝟏  where  ?̃?𝒊 ⊂ ?̃? 
 Select from the fuzzy set ?̃? a fuzzy set ?̃?𝒌 fuzzified 
with membership function 𝑴𝑭𝒌 to unlock the vault 
 Let |?̃?𝒌|=𝒕𝑴𝑭𝒌  
 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒊 = 𝟏 𝒕𝒐 𝒕𝑴𝑭𝒌  do 
{    
   𝒊𝒇 (|(?̃?𝒊 − ?̃?𝒊|) ≤ ?̃? 𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒏 
     {   
       𝒙𝒊 ← ?̃?𝒊 
       ?̃?𝒊 ← Correspondent fuzzy point for ?̃?𝒊 in ?̃?  
      }     
   } 
 ?̃? = {(𝒙𝒊, ?̃?𝒊)|∀𝒙𝒊 ∈ ?̃?𝒌, ∀?̃?𝒊 ∈ 𝑭?̃?} 
 Use Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct 
polynomial 𝒑∗ with degree 𝒏 which satisfies the 
points from set ?̃? 
 Retrieve 𝜷𝒊
∗𝒊 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐, 𝟑,…𝒏 for polynomial 𝒑∗ 
 𝒊𝒇 |𝜷𝒊 − 𝜷𝒊
∗
| ≤ ̃ then 𝜷𝒊
∗ = 𝜷𝒊 𝒊 = 𝟎, 𝟏, 𝟐, …𝒏 
 ∗ =Concatenate (𝜷𝟏
∗, 𝜷𝟐
∗, ……𝜷𝒏
∗) 
 Let 𝒎∗ be the generated 𝟏𝟔 − 𝒃𝒊𝒕s CRC data for the 
reconstructed key ∗ 
 Let 𝒎 be the extracted 16-bits appended to ∗ 
 If | 𝒎 –𝒎∗ |≤ 𝜹 then output  
Otherwise 𝒏𝒖𝒍𝒍 
 
If (|(?̃?𝑖 − ?̃?𝑖| ) ≤ ?̃? 𝑖 = 1,2,… . . 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘  then  
 Assign ?̃?𝑖  to ?̃?𝑖 and assign ?̃?𝑖 to its correspondent fuzzy 
point for ?̃?𝑖 in?̃?.  
 
  To calculate 𝑝𝑛(?̃?) Lagrange interpolation is performed 
as follows: 
𝐿𝑛,𝑗(?̃?) = ∏  
𝑥−𝑥𝑘
𝑥𝑗−𝑥𝑘
𝑛+1
𝑘=1,𝑘≠𝑗                (30) 
Where: 
 {𝐿𝑛,𝑗}, ∀ 𝑗 = 1,…… . . 𝑛 + 1 are called the Lagrange 
polynomials for the interpolation fuzzy points 
?̃?1, ?̃?2, … ?̃?𝑛+1  obtained from fuzzy set ?̃?.  
∴ 𝑝𝑛(?̃?) = ∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑛+1
𝑗=1 𝐿𝑛,𝑗(?̃?)                              (31) 
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V. Security Analysis 
The security of the proposed fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme 
depends on: 
 The number and size of fuzzy subsets of multi-fuzzy 
finite field 𝐹?̃?. 
 The 𝑚 membership functions used to fuzzify 𝐹?̃?. 
 The number and size of fuzzy subsets of the locking 
multi-fuzzy set ?̃?. 
 The number and size of the locking fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑘. 
 The number of fuzzy chaff points 𝑟 −  𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘  in the 
se𝑡 𝑅 where |𝑅|= 𝑟 and |?̃?𝑘|=𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘 . 
 Type and number of fuzzy chaff points 𝑟 −  𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑘in the 
se𝑡 𝑅. 
 As the number of fuzzy chaff points that do not lie on 
polynomial 𝑝 or may lie on polynomial 𝑝 but with 
different membership functions increase the more 
fuzziness the fuzzy- fuzzy vault to conceal the correct 
polynomial 𝑝. As many fuzzy chaff points are added to 𝑅 
the more polynomials 𝑝 emerge. In the absence of any 
information about the multi-fuzzy subsets ?̃? and 𝐹?̃? and 
their 𝑚 membership functions 𝑀𝐹(?̃?) and 𝑀𝐹(𝐹?̃?) an 
attacker could not know about the structure of the fuzzy 
points used in locking the vault and cannot distinguish 
between the large numbers of polynomials to find the 
correct polynomial 𝑝. This improves the security 
threshold of the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme. The following 
lemma proves that with high probability many 
polynomials of degree less than 𝑘 agree with the target 
set 𝑅 in 𝑡𝑇𝐹𝑘 places which means there are many spurious 
polynomials. This lemma is a modification of Lemma 4 
presented in [1].  
  
A. Lemma 1 
    From Lemma 4 in [1], for every µ, where 0 < µ < 1 
with probability at least 1 − µ the target set 𝑅  containing 
𝑟 fuzzy points generated by the algorithm 
FUZZY_LOCK on polynomial 𝑝 and a locking fuzzy 
set ?̃?  divided into 𝑚𝐴 subsets fuzzy- with 𝑚𝐴 
membership functions as in eq.(21) satisfy the following 
condition: there exist at least µ𝑁 polynomials 𝑝′of degree 
less than 𝑘 such that 𝑅 includes exactly 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  fuzzy points 
of the form (?̃?, 𝑝′(?̃?)) 𝑅 and 𝑁 is calculated as follows:   
 
𝑁 =  𝑞𝑘 ( 𝑟
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
) (
𝑚𝐴
𝑞
)
𝑘−𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
(1 −
𝑚𝐴
𝑞
)
𝑟−𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
             (32) 
Where:  
 𝑝(?̃?𝑖|𝑀𝐹𝑗) =
𝑝(?̃?𝑖∩𝑀𝐹𝑗)
𝑝(𝑀𝐹𝑗)
=
1
𝑞
1
𝑚𝐴
= 
1
𝑞
 × 𝑚𝐴 =
𝑚𝐴
𝑞
       (33) 
𝑚𝐴: is the number of membership functions used to 
fuzzify the locking set ?̃?. 
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗: is the number of points fuzzy- with the membership 
function 𝑀𝐹𝑗. 
Thus the expected number of polynomials of degree less 
than k that fit with 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  of the 𝑟 random points is 𝑁. The 
algorithm FUZZY_LOCK will use the set of 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗fuzzy- 
points with membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑗 and fit to 
polynomial 𝑝 to output 𝑅 . Then the number of 
polynomials in agreement with the 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  points is much 
less than 𝜇𝑁. To prove this, construct a huge (𝑚 + 1)-
partite graph where one partite represents polynomials 𝑝 
with degree less than 𝑘, one vertex for each polynomial. 
The other 𝑚-partite vertices represent vectors correspond 
to 𝑚𝐴 fuzzy subsets with 𝑚𝐴 membership functions such 
that:  
?̃?𝑡𝑞 = ⋃ ?̃?𝑀𝐹𝑗
𝑚𝐴
𝑗=1                                                       (34)    
where: 
?̃?𝑀𝐹𝑗 = (?̃?1𝑀𝐹𝑗
, ?̃?2𝑀𝐹𝑗
… . , ?̃?𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
) each partite 
corresponds to vectors with specific membership grade 
function 𝑀𝐹𝑗.  
∴ ?̃?𝑟𝑞 = ?̃?
𝑡
𝑞 
⋃ ?̃?𝑟−𝑡𝑞                                 (35) 
Two vertices 𝑝 and ?̃?𝑇𝐹𝑗are adjacent  if 𝑝 agrees with 
?̃?𝑀𝐹𝑗  i.e. if 𝑝(?̃?𝑖) = ?̃?𝑖𝑇𝐹𝑗
for exactly 𝑡𝑇𝐹𝑗 choices of 𝑡. It 
is clear that the number of polynomials in agreement with 
the 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  points is much less than the number of 
polynomials in agreement with 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗 . Since it is 
proved form Lemma 4 in [1] that the number of 
polynomials in agreement with 𝑡 points in classical fuzzy 
vault scheme to be less than μN, is at most μ. Therefore, 
as the number of polynomials in agreement with 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  in 
the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme is much less than 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  
then the number of polynomials that agree with exactly 
choice of 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  points will be much less than μN which is 
the number of polynomials in agreement with 𝑡 in the 
classical fuzzy vault scheme with a probability much less 
than μ. This increases the security of the fuzz-fuzzy vault 
scheme over the fuzz-fuzzy vault scheme. The proposed 
fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme deals better with non-uniform 
distribution of the fuzzy- locking points as different fuzzy 
points are fuzzy- with different membership functions 
and these fuzzy points may not be equally likely. Assume 
that all fuzzy locking elements in ?̃? are fuzzy- with one 
membership function 𝑀𝐹𝑗 then they are all equally likely 
to come from the same family of fuzzy sets ̃  ⊂  2𝑈 =
 2𝐹?̃? . 
 
B. Lemma 2 
    According to Lemma 5 presented in [1] for every μ > 
0, with probability at least 1 –  𝜇 the target 𝑅 generated 
by the FUZZY_LOCK algorithm to commit to 
polynomial 𝑝 with locking set Ã there exist at least 
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µ|̃| 𝑞𝑘  (
( 𝑟
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
)
( 𝑞
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
)
⁄ )
 
(
𝑚𝐴
𝑞⁄ )
𝑘−𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  (1 −
𝑚𝐴
𝑞⁄ )
𝑟−𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
   
                                                                                                         (36)         
polynomials 𝑝′ ∈ 𝑃 such that ?̃? agrees with 𝑝′ on some  
subset of 𝑡 points in the ̃ family.   
 
 
C. Lemma 3 
From the construction of the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme 
it is clear that its security is based on the security of the 
classical fuzzy vault scheme and on the multi-fuzzy sets 
which are fuzzy- with multiple fuzzy membership 
functions. The probability for an attacker to learn about 
the number of ?̃? fuzzy subsets chosen from the subsets of 
the fuzzy finite field ?̃?𝑞 is 
𝑚𝐴
𝑚𝐹
 , also the probability for an 
attacker to learn about the fuzzy subset ?̃?𝑗  fuzzy- by 𝑀𝐹𝑗 
chosen from ?̃? is 
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
𝑡
  where |?̃?𝑗| = 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗  and |?̃?| = 𝑡. 
The more the chaff points to create noise in set 𝑅 to hide 
the genuine polynomial 𝑝 the more spurious polynomials 
which look like the genuine polynomial 𝑝 are generated 
to protect polynomial 𝑝  from an attacker. Based on the 
probability presented in [2], the modified probability for 
an attacker to obtain the genuine polynomial 𝑝 with 𝑛 
degree in the fuzzy- fuzzy vault is: 
 
∏  (
𝑚𝐴
𝑚𝐹
 ×
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
𝑡
 ×
𝑡
𝑟
)
𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=0 =  (
𝑚𝐴
𝑚𝐹
 ×  
𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑗
𝑟
)
𝑛
             (37) 
  
It is evident from lemma 2 and lemma 3 that the fuzzy- 
fuzzy vault which is the fuzzy version of the classical 
fuzzy vault will significantly reduce the probability for an 
attacker to restore the genuine polynomial 𝑝. This is 
much better compared with the probability introduced by 
the classical fuzzy vault. 
 
VI. Application of Fuzzy- Fuzzy Vaults 
 
In the example mentioned in [1] where the movie 
lover’s problem is expected to choose 2 movies out of 10 
categories and each category contains 1000 movies. The 
distribution set will be ((10
3
2
))10. Suppose that  𝑟 = 𝑞 =
104, 𝑡 = 20, 𝑘 = 16 then by lemma 5 of the classical 
vault in [1] one expects to find 2106 polynomials of 
degree at most 15 agreeing with data on 20 points. Then 
with probability is 1 − 2−53 there will be 253 
polynomials exhibiting this behavior. Now, Let the 
movie lover selects five triangular membership functions 
with different parameters i.e. 𝑚𝐴 = 5. Assume the movie 
lover used the 5 fuzzify membership functions to fuzzify 
all the genuine and chaff points, then by using lemma 2 
in this paper then one expects to find 2249 polynomials of 
degree at most 15 with data on 20 points. The probability 
is 1 − 2−125 for 2125 polynomials to exhibit this 
behavior. Thus, we achieved roughly 125-bit security 
using the fuzzy- fuzzy vault. This is much better than 53-
bit security using the classical fuzzy vault. Let us use 𝑟 =
𝑞 = 104, 𝑡 = 22, 𝑘 = 18 then by using lemma 5 in [1] 
we expect 2139 polynomials of degree less then 18 
agreeing with 22 points out of 104. Then with the 
probability 1 − 2−70 there will be 270 polynomials 
exhibiting this behavior. This is equivalent to roughly 70-
bit security. Using the proposed fuzzy- fuzzy vault with 
𝑚𝐴 = 5 we expect 2
276 polynomials of degree less than 
18 with data on 22 points. Then with the probability 1 −
2−138 there will be 2138 polynomials exhibiting this 
behavior. This is equivalent to roughly 138-bit security 
which is much better than using the classical fuzzy vault. 
To construct a strong personal entropy system the user in 
[1] was asked to answer 29 questions correctly out of 32 
i.e. 𝑡 = 32 and 𝑘 = 25 thus achieving 85-bit security. By 
using the fuzzy-fuzzy vault scheme we much better than 
the strong personal entropy system mentioned in [1] with 
𝑘=18 much less than 25. 
 
  
VII. Conclusions 
 
The proposed fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme is considered an 
addition to the community of fuzzy cryptography where 
imprecision and uncertainty improves the security 
threshold of the classical cryptographic techniques. As a 
result the fuzzy- fuzzy vault needs less number of genuine 
points to lock a secret key in the vault and generates a 
larger number of chaff points which adds noise to conceal 
the real polynomial which hides the secret key. This will 
improve the security threshold of the fuzzy vault. The 
applications of fuzzy- fuzzy vault are the same for 
classical fuzzy vault scheme but with an improved 
security threshold. An important area for further research 
is to improve the fuzzy- fuzzy vault scheme by using type-
2 fuzzy sets. 
 
VIII.  Fingerprints Fuzzy-Fuzzy Vault  
 
Classical fingerprints fuzzy vaults are used to secure 
data using minutiae. However, the classical fingerprint 
fuzzy vault assumes that each minutia has an exact 
orientation which lies in the following set of orientations 
𝜃°  and this is not always true. For example the orientation 
of minutia 𝑚 can lie in the interval [𝜃°1,, 𝜃°2 ] which are 
taken from the following set of orientations: 
𝜃°
= {0°,  22.5°, 45°, 67.5°,  90°, 112.5°, 135°, 157.5°, 180°, 202.5°,  
225°, 247.5°, 270°, 292.5°, 315°} 
Fig. 2 shows the bifurcation and ridge ending minutiae 
with their orientations. 
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(a)      (b) 
Fig. Ridge ending and bifurcation orientations 
This means that it a minutia can lie between within an 
interval of orientations. For example, the ridge ending in 
(a) can lie in the interval [202.5°, 225°, 247.5°] and the 
bifurcation in (b) can lie in the interval [292.5°, 315°,0°]. 
This means that each minutia orientation can be treated 
as a triangular fuzzy number. 
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